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The aim of this thesis is to study the effect on repayment behavior of a regulation imposed
on all Norwegian credit card issuing institutions in 2017. The intervention involved
changing the invoice default option from the minimum to the full outstanding credit card
balance. Using a sample of 25% of Eika Kredittbank’s credit card customers, covering
all transactions and repayments from May 2015 through December 2019, we document
that the Norwegian government’s attempt to increase repayment of credit card debt was
successful.
We apply a fixed effects estimator at the individual level and find a positive but
small average effect of the default option change on repayment ratio. As we believe that
the observed small effect could be related to the fact that average repayment in Norway
is high, we aimed to examine whether the impact would be larger for customers that
initially paid a smaller proportion of their credit card balance. For this purpose, we
divided customers into groups based on pre-regulation repayment patterns. The division
and subsequent analysis suggest that as a response to the change, near-minimum and
medium paying customers show an increase of 19.2 and 7.5 percentage points, respectively.
The findings demonstrate the power of the default effect, and suggest that nudging
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1 Introduction
The rapid growth of the consumer credit market has become a prominent feature of
modern economies across the world. Credit cards allow customers to borrow funds from
the issuing bank or financial institution to be used among merchants who accept it as
a form of payment (Bloomenthal, 2020). According to Gjeldsregisteret (2020), there
are more than 3.2 million Norwegian customers with unsecured debt (credit cards and
consumer loans), with a total credit limit of 250.9 billion NOK of which 54 billion is
interest bearing. The option of credit spending provides the customer with increased
financial flexibility. However, negligent spending can incur substantial costs, as customers
who do not pay outstanding debt in time will be subject to high interest rates, often
between 15% and 25% annually (Finansportalen, 2020). This particularly impacts
customers choosing to only pay the minimum amount needed to stay afloat. As credit
card default and high interest rates have become an increasing problem in Norway, a key
question is how policy makers can prevent this development.
Minimum payments constitute a salient feature of credit cards, which stipulate
the lowest payment customers must pay in order to keep their account in good
standing in a given month (Keys and Wang, 2019). The minimum amount is
calculated as a small percentage of the outstanding debt, often a number between
3% and 5% (Finansportalen, 2020). Hence, for the vast majority of customers, the
minimum payment is a lower bound on the optimal repayment due to the arising costs
associated with paying less than the minimum. Until recently, credit card invoices in
Norway stated the minimum payment as the default option. Consequently, to pay the
total outstanding amount, customers actively had to change the monthly payment amount.
In order to limit the growth in credit card debt, the Norwegian government introduced
a policy change regarding credit card invoicing. From mid-2017, all credit card issuers
were required to issue invoices with the full outstanding amount as the default option,
replacing the minimum amount. The regulation aimed to simplify full credit repayment,
encouraging customers to repay their total outstanding amount at initial invoicing
(Regjeringen, 2016).
2
The intervention can be viewed as a nudge from the Norwegian government, aiming to
improve repayment behavior through the change of default option. Previous literature has
proven that changes to default options can be effective in altering individuals’ decision
making (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). The changed behavior humans exhibit as a cause
of choosing the default option, is termed the default effect. The default effect is one of the
most well-known behavioral biases, which arises because individuals tend to stick with
the current or default choices, even when other options are available (van Kleef et al., 2018).
The default effect in the context of credit debt repayment is a field of study
lacking research. Our study seeks to examine whether the psychological effects default
options entail can lead customers to alter credit card debt repayments. We aim to
investigate whether the regulation has had a positive effect on credit card debt repayment,
and whether this can be attributed to the default effect. Furthermore, we seek to answer
whether the potential impact differs between various customer types. To our knowledge,
this empirical study is the first to estimate the causal impact of the default effect on
repayment behavior. We believe that our findings will be valuable insight for institutions
and governments internationally.
Our thesis is structured as follows: In chapter 2 we provide relevant literature
on the topics of interest. In chapter 3 we present background and information about the
governmental intervention, as well as our hypotheses. In chapter 4 we detail the data
and present descriptive statistics for variables used in our study, before we present the
methodology our analysis builds upon in chapter 5. In chapter 6, we report all analysis
results. In chapter 7 we interpret and discuss the findings, and comment on limitations to
our data and analysis. We finally summarize the results in chapter 8.
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2 Literature Review
In the following chapter, we give an overview of relevant literature to provide a better
understanding of the relationship between this study and previous research. As previously
pointed out, our study is the first to examine how changing the invoice default option
from the minimum to the full credit card balance impacts repayment. Accordingly, there
is a lack of relevant literature on the relationship of interest. However, there exists an
extensive amount of research on the behavioral implications of default options as well as
the general features of credit cards. Thus, the chapter is divided into two main sections: in
the first, we present relevant literature on the default effect, the anchoring effect and nudge
theory. Second, we consider the literature on credit card debt and minimum payments.
2.1 The default effect
During the last decades, research in economics and psychology has shown that human
decision making often is affected by subtle supposedly irrelevant factors (Thaler and
Ganser, 2015). Within the field of behavioral economics, the default effect is the concept
that individuals experiencing choice avoidance, tend to select the default option, thus
keeping the status quo (van Kleef et al., 2018). Moreover, individuals might believe that
the default is chosen for a reason and accordingly think it is the optimal choice. Whether
altered default options can produce significant behavioral change among humans, is
consequently an important consideration.
The literature shows several examples of default effects. Johnson and Goldstein
(2003) examine the differences in organ donation participation, comparing countries using
an opt-in system to those using an opt-out system. In the opt-in system, individuals
have to opt-in in order to become an organ donor, and are not enrolled in the program if
no action is taken. In contrast, all participants in the opt-out system are organ donors,
unless they actively opt out. Figure 2.1 shows the consent rate in European countries
with different systems. There is a strikingly large difference in consent between countries
which presumably are fairly similar, such as Germany (12% consent rate) and Austria
(99.98% consent rate) or Denmark (4.25% consent rate) and Sweden (85.9% consent rate).
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Figure 2.1: Figure adopted from Johnson and Goldstein (2003)
The study illustrates the power of the default effect. The authors argue that keeping
the default requires less effort than making a switch. Hence, countries facing an opt-out
system show a much higher participation rate. Studies on the effect of opt-in versus
opt-out systems in organ donation have led more countries to adopt the opt-out system,
with the United Kingdom being one of the most recent adopters (Department of Health
and Social Care, 2020).
In a field study, Choi et al. (2001) investigated whether automatic enrollment
in 401(k) pension plans affects saving decisions. Studying three U.S companies, the
authors examine the effect of switching from a volunteer enrollment (opt-in) to an
automatic enrollment (opt-out). They found that adopting an opt-out system significantly
increases 401(k) participation in all companies. Figure 2.2. illustrates the effect for one of
the companies.
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Figure 2.2: Figure adopted from Choi et al. (2001)
When the companies changed to an opt-out system, they also chose a default contribution
rate and fund allocation. The default contribution rate was set at 2% in company
A and 3% in company B and C. On the other hand, the employees enrolled in the
opt-in system had to actively choose their contribution rate, as they were not provided
with a default option. Interestingly, the authors found that automatic enrollment in
401(k) saving plans led most employees to keep the default contribution rate and fund
allocation. For the employees who actively chose to participate in 401(k) saving plans
during the opt-in system, the modal contribution rate was 6% in all three companies.
The employees automatically enrolled during the opt-out system, however, exhibited a
contribution rate of 2% in company A and 3% in company B and C. The findings indicate
that automatic enrollment increases the likelihood of passively accepting the default option.
The findings from the organ donation and pension saving studies provide examples of how
automatic enrollment can lead to increased participation, attributed to the default effect.
One important distinction is that becoming an organ donor does not incur any financial
obligations, while enrollment into pension savings do. Hence, the 401(k) savings plan
study suggests that even when a presented option has financial consequences, people tend
to choose the default. Moreover, economist Stefano Dellavigna (2009) points out that
"(...)the finding of large default effects is one of the most robust results in the applied
economics literature of the last ten years."
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2.1.1 Anchoring
Another central concept to human decision making, is anchoring. In their 1974 paper
"Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman (1974) explained anchoring as a phenomenon which arises in situations where
"(...) people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the
final answer". Accordingly, the final estimate is biased toward the initial value.
The literature has examined the relationship between default options and anchoring. Park
et al. (2000) illustrate this through three studies which aim to examine the difference
between additive- and subtractive option framing on customers’ decision making. The
participants were presented with situations where they were assigned a product, and
subsequently were able to add or subtract certain options. The customers assigned to the
subtractive option framing were presented with a "fully loaded" product and asked to
remove the product options they did not want. The customers assigned to the additive
option framing were presented with a base product and asked to add the product options
they wanted. Moreover, the groups were confronted with the corresponding price of the
base- or fully loaded product. The price would increase (decrease) for each option that
was added (removed).
The studies showed that customers presented with a subtractive option framing,
included significantly more options than customers in the additive group, leading to a
higher total price. Accordingly, the authors argue that both the price and the options the
customer initially were presented with, served as anchors. The studies suggest that the
participants were biased towards their initial assigned status, in other words, towards
their default options, which they based subsequent judgement upon. This illustrates how
individuals’ decision making can be influenced by default options, even when they do not
accept the default option itself.
The previously discussed findings imply that individuals presumed rational decision
making can be altered simply by the way certain options are presented. Business owners,
governments or other stakeholders may use this notion in order to achieve a desired result.
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Influencing individuals through such behavioral tweaks, is called nudging.
2.1.2 Nudging
Thaler and Sunstein (2009) give the following definition of a nudge:
"A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be
easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level counts
as a nudge. Banning junk food does not."
Central to the theory of nudging is choice architecture, meaning how a choice is
designed. The theory states that even small tweaks to the choice architecture,
implemented correctly, can lead to substantial changes in behavior. Nudges have proven
to be effective in certain instances, particularly when individuals are facing complex
options or when the benefits from a specific choice are not instantly rewarded (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2009). Examples of such situations include incentivizing people to pay their
taxes, recycle or eating healthy (Rohaidi, 2020).
Similar examples of successful nudge interventions have led the topic to gain
popularity. The field of work is steadily increasing and nudge units have been established
in several countries, including the UK’s Behavioral Insights Team (The Behavioral
Insights Team, 2020) and the US’ Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (Shankar, 2015).
2.2 Credit card debt and minimum payments
It has been the aim of governments and other regulatory bodies to slow down the credit
markets and limit the interest driven debt (Regjeringen, 2016). Previous research has
focused on the design of credit card invoices and the nature of the minimum payment
option.
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Keys and Wang (2019) conducted a study on a sample of one quarter of the US
general-purpose credit card market, where they documented that 29% of customers
regularly make payments at or close to the minimum payment. The authors investigated
the effect on debt repayment when implementing changes to the minimum payment
formula, by increasing or decreasing the minimum amount. Additionally, Keys and
Wang (2019) investigated whether various customer groups responded differently to the
changes. For that purpose, customers were divided into the groups exact minimum payer,
near-minimum payer, mixed payer and full payer.
The authors found that 9% of all customers and at least 22% of near-minimum
payers responded to the changes in a manner consistent with the anchoring effect. They
found that the anchoring effect was immediate, regardless of whether the amount was
adjusted upwards or downwards. On this ground, they argue that the minimum payment
can serve as an anchor, and that the effect was most prevalent among the low paying
customers. The findings imply that adjusting the size of the minimum payment is a useful
measure in affecting credit card debt repayment.
In their 2015 paper, Jones et al. (2015) investigated what effect informational
nudges implemented in the US credit card market through the The Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act, had on consumers’ debt
repayment. The act imposed a range of regulations on credit card issuers, where the most
significant changes regarded the monthly billing statements. The act required information
on payment due date and late fees, payoff times and penalty interest rates to be stated on
the front page of the invoice.
The authors found that the monthly repayments (relative to debt) after the CARD
act, increased by 5.9 percentage points compared to before the change. Moreover, the
study suggests that the likelihood of paying the full outstanding amount for the average
customer increased by 10 percentage points after the CARD act was implemented.
Lastly, the authors found that customers who experienced recurring month-to-month
debt (customers who carry credit card balances month to month), did not demonstrate
changed behavior following the CARD act. They argue that the customers with recurring
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debt are more likely to be liquidity constrained, which prevents them from repaying more
than the minimum. The findings imply that informational nudges are integral for credit
card repayment. Such nudges make consumers aware of the actual cost of credit card use,
which could lead to an increase in debt repayment. The latter finding implies that various
customer types tend to respond differently to informational nudges and that nudges might
be overshadowed by other, more powerful effects.
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3 Background
In the following chapter, we present the motivation behind the government regulation
and details surrounding the implementation. Subsequently, we present the motivation
behind our study, before we conclude the chapter with a presentation of our hypotheses.
3.1 Motivation behind the regulation
Throughout the last decade, the Norwegian credit market has grown substantially (Wig,
2020). Because credit card debt normally involves high interest rates, deferral of payments
can become expensive. The Norwegian Consumer Authority1 argue that credit card
customers value financial institutions providing them with an invoicing solution that
encourages them to make the most financially sensible choice (Haugseth, 2016). On that
basis, Norwegian authorities imposed the previous guidelines on all credit card issuers in
Norway to align with customers’ preferences (Regjeringen, 2016).
In 2013, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSA) proposed new
guidelines for invoicing of credit cards, implying that issuers should display the default
option as either unfilled or the total amount due (Regjeringen, 2016). The guidelines
were motivated by surveys revealing that credit card issuers did not inform customers
adequately about the costs late credit card repayment incurs. Their research revealed
that credit card issuing institutions exhibited varying degrees of guideline implementation.
As a result, the guidelines were further updated in 2016, encouraging issuing institutions
to state the full outstanding credit card debt as the default option.
The issuing institutions and the FSA received many customer inquiries regarding
the possibility to be invoiced the total outstanding amount (Regjeringen, 2016).
Furthermore, a study showed that approximately half of the customers paid the total
outstanding amount or more, a quarter paid more than the minimum amount but less
than the total amount, whilst the remaining customers paid the minimum amount. The
1
The Consumer Authority is an independent administrative body of the responsibility of supervising
measures in the market and seek to exert influence on traders to observe the regulatory framework
(Forbrukertilsynet, 2020).
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survey results along with with the customer inquiries, caused the FSA to enforce the
previous guidelines on all relevant institutions. The regulation required all financial
institutions to issue invoices displaying the total outstanding amount as the default
(Regjeringen, 2017). The main motivation behind the regulation was to make customers
more aware of the cost of consumer credit, while simultaneously making it easier to repay
outstanding credit card balance (Regjeringen, 2016).
The FSA further argues that "the regulations can contribute to more customers
paying the total outstanding credit when invoiced for the first time. This means less
interest costs for customers and, on the other hand, less interest income for credit card
issuers. The regulations will help reduce the risk of customers incurring debt which can
later impose significant financial burdens on them" (Regjeringen, 2016). The provision
stipulates how the invoicing should be carried out, and does not determine the amount
the customers are obligated to pay. Hence, the regulation encourages repayment while it
continues to preserve the flexibility credit cards provide.
3.1.1 Implementation of the change
The regulation was imposed on all Norwegian credit card suppliers, with the notion that
the change of default had to be implemented by June 15th 2017. The bank considered
in this study, implemented the default option change on all invoices in February 2017
(appendix figure A.1). In addition to the default option change, the new guidelines
mandated the suppliers to provide a sufficient description of the consequences of paying
less than the total credit card balance. This included a table showing the costs of different
payments, which intended to provide the customers with an accurate depiction of the cost
of deferred repayments2.
3.2 Motivation for our study
Benartzi et al. (2017) argue that interventions aiming to alter decision making through
nudges are by nature easy and cost-efficient to implement. However, the implications
2
In the thesis, we consider customers from a large Norwegian bank which had implemented the
mandated cost table on all invoices, prior to the regulation. Hence, changing the invoice default option
was the considered bank’s only implication of the regulation in 2017.
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of such interventions are debated. In a quantitative study, Hummel et al. (2019) find
that "(...)only 62% of nudging treatments are statistically significant", that "Nudges
have a median effect size of 21% which depends on the category and context" and
finally that "Defaults are most effective while precommitment strategies are least effective".
With this in mind, we find it interesting to research whether the Norwegian
government’s attempt to nudge credit card customers into paying a larger proportion
of their debt, has had a significant effect on repayment. Affirmative findings would
strengthen the argument that nudge interventions can be efficient, and encourage larger
scale research in the future. Moreover, previous research has found that adjustments
to information given on credit card invoices (Jones et al., 2015) and modifications to
minimum payment formulas (Keys and Wang, 2019), can lead to increased credit card
debt repayment. With the aim of expanding on this research, an interesting aspect to our
study is whether stating the full credit card balance as the default amount, provides an
approach yielding more desired results than changing the required minimum.
As previously pointed out, a survey conducted by the FSA revealed that approximately
50% of Norwegian customers paid off their total credit card balance, 25% paid an amount
between the minimum and the total amount whilst the rest paid the minimum amount.
Inspired by the survey, we find it particularly interesting to research whether repayment
ratio increases as a cause of the regulation implementation, despite the fact that most
customers seem to pay the full amount to start with. Secondly, if the customers who
paid a low proportion initially did so as a cause of paying the default option, we believe
that these customers are likely to increase their repayment relatively more than the other
customers. Consequently, we present our two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Changing the default option from the minimum to the full amount led to
an average increase in monthly credit card debt repayment in Norway
Hypothesis 2: Changing the default option led to a larger than average increase
in monthly credit card debt repayment within the segment of customers who initially
paid a low proportion of their monthly debt in Norway
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4 Data
In this chapter we present the data used to investigate the effect of the default option
change on repayment ratio in Norway. Lastly, we describe the variables included in the
main specified regression model and report descriptive statistics.
4.1 Data collection
We collected account-level data from Eika Kredittbank, which is a credit card distributor
and a part of Eika Alliansen. The latter is a financial service company consisting
of approximately 60 banks located across Norway (Eika Alliansen, 2020). The credit
bank provide approximately 330,000 customers with credit cards, and the collected
data contained all customer transactions ranging from May 2015 through August 2020.
Additionally, information about transaction date, encrypted account ID, age group, county,
credit card limit, negative- and positive transactions and transaction-specific information
(amount, currency and in some cases, the type of transaction) were included.
4.2 Data preparation
For analysis purposes, we needed to distinguish consumption from repayments. However,
because we exclusively received category information from 2017 onwards, repayments are
separated from consumption by categorizing negative transactions as consumption and
positive transactions as repayments. Otherwise, data from 2017 and forward would not
be consistent with 2015 and 2016 data. Negative transactions are solely consumption,
while positive transactions can be repayments, refunds or internal payments. Hence,
refunds and internal payments might be mistakenly categorized as repayments, yielding a
repayment ratio slightly higher than what is realistic. However, such transactions will
presumably occur both before and after the policy change, balancing out the impact from
the misplacement. Because the main objective of the research is to examine the difference
in repayment before and after the regulation, a slightly higher repayment ratio in both
periods should not invalidate our findings.
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To increase estimation precision, it is desirable to include as many months as possible.
However, the COVID-19 pandemic had a substantial impact on credit card usage and
repayment ratio (Eika, 2020). Hence, we find it more appropriate to leave data from 2020
out of our analysis to avoid the noise it entails. It is however worth noting that it remains
a critical topic for the credit card market in the months and years to come.
Our prepared dataset contains individual data at the transaction level and ranges from
May 2015 to August 2019, which constitutes an unbalanced panel. An unbalanced panel
implies that the dataset does not contain repayment observations on all customers in all
months, as not all customers use their credit card every month. Additionally, we removed
customers without categorical information (age, county and credit card limit), as well as
customers that do not appear both before and after the change. Hence, we compare the
same customers and control for relevant time varying background characteristics. The
customers missing categorical information exhibit the same pattern as the other customers
(evidence can be provided upon request). Consequently, removing them is not of any
concern. The prepared data include 182,471 customers yielding a total of approximately
7.9 million paired observations of consumption and repayments, aggregated per customer
per month.
4.2.1 Dependent variable of interest
A caveat on this data is that it lacks information on repayments as a share of outstanding
debt. In order to measure the effect of altering the default option on debt repayment, we
created a proxy for repayment ratio. Because customers are invoiced the month after credit
card use, the analysis hinges upon the assumption that the customers pay their credit
card balance the month after consumption. Consequently, we calculate the repayment
ratio according to the following equation:
Repayment ratio =
Repayment inmonth n+ 1
Consumption inmonth n
If a customer repays the entire debt in a given month, repayment should correspond
exactly to consumption in the prior month.
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Additionally, we have limited the ratio to be a number between 0 and 1, stipulating a
repayment between 0 and 100 percent of the outstanding debt. In some cases, the actual
ratio is higher than 1 (negative balance), indicating that customers pay more than the
outstanding amount. In such instances, our proxy variable would be unrealistically low.
The following are examples of scenarios where this could occur:
1: A customer has accumulated debt over several months, and eventually repays
a large fraction in a month with relatively low consumption
2: A customer is repaying more than 100% of the debt prior to consumption in
order to increase the credit limit for a period (e.g if the customer is planning to make a
large purchase, and wants to pay via credit card)
We imposed the limitation in order to get a realistic mean of repayment over
time. Without an upper limit on the ratio, a high one-time repayment could lead to an
artificially high average for certain customers. For interpretation purposes, we also find it
reasonable to report the repayment ratio as a decimal between 0 and 1.
4.2.2 Independent variables
The independent variable we are interested in estimating the effect of, is defined as the
dummy Post intervention which is 1 after the intervention in February 2017, and 0
before (detailed in chapter 5). For descriptive purposes, we focus on the following control
variables3:
Monthly transactions: The number of transactions per customer for a given month
Consumption: The total credit card consumption per individual per month in NOK
3
Month-fixed effects are also included as control variables in the main regression model, which will be
further detailed in chapter 5
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For analysis purposes, we utilize a random sample of 25% of our prepared dataset from
May 2015 to December 2019, which comprises 45,618 unique customers. The sample
includes a total of approximately 2 million aggregated monthly consumption observations
including associated repayments. The tables below show summary statistics for the full
sample and the 25% sample, respectively.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for the full sample
Statistic Median Mean Min 1st Qu. 3rd Qu. Max
Consumption 1,470 3,886 0 450 4,580 1,238,760
Repayment 1,480 3,850 0 460 4,180 1,270,260
Ratio before 1 0.80 0 0.60 1 1
Monthly transactions 4 6.8 1 2 8 538
Average purchase - 605.8 - - - -
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the 25% random sample
Statistic Median Mean Min 1st Qu. 3rd Qu. Max
Consumption 1,470 3,906 0 450 4,600 859,240
Repayment 1,490 3,905 0 490 4,280 859,250
Ratio before 1 0.80 0 0.60 1 1
Monthly transactions 4 6.87 1 2 8 293
Average purchase - 606 - - - -
Examining table 4.1 and 4.2, we observe that both average monthly consumption and
repayment per individual is close to 4000. Another interesting finding looking at Ratio
before is that customers on average repay 80%, before the intervention. The reported
median is 1, pointing out that at least 50% of the observations are full repayments.
Moreover, customers carry out approximately 7 transactions on average each month, while
the average transaction size is approximately 606 NOK. It is worth noting that the tables
depict large sample differences in maximum consumption and repayment. The maximum
values are substantially lower for the 25% sample distribution than for the full sample.
However, the reported samples’ mean and median are approximately similar, which is a
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consequence of the large sample sizes. Henceforth, we utilize the 25% random sample.
Figure 4.1: Development of average consumption and repayments
Figure 4.1 provides a visual representation of the development of consumption and
repayment throughout the time period. It is evident that repayments and consumption
strongly covariate. We observe clear fluctuation with peaks in the summer months
and troughs in the winter months. Furthermore, there seems to be a minor change in
consumption and repayment trends, with relatively higher repayments from mid-2017.
However, the figure should be carefully interpreted as macroeconomic factors are likely to
exert influence.
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4.3.1 Customer characteristics
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the sample’s credit card limit-, age-, and county distribution.
Figure 4.2: Fraction of customers within credit card limit segments
Figure 4.3: Fraction of customers in age segments
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Figure 4.4: Fraction of customers within counties
Examining figure 4.2 and 4.3, we observe that around half of the customer base have a
credit card limit between 10,001 and 30,000 and approximately 26% of the customers are
64 years or older. It is worth noting that the age group 64+ is a broader segment than the
other groups. Looking at the customer distribution between different counties shown in
figure 4.4, we observe that Viken and Trøndelag have the largest proportion of customers.
This coincides with the distribution of banks in Eika Alliansen, displayed in appendix
table A.1.
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics for near-minimum payers
With the intention of testing our second hypothesis, we separate customers into groups
based on their repayment behavior prior to the regulation4. We define near-minimum
payers as individuals with an average initial repayment ratio below 50%. This group
constitutes 3,202 customers, which is approximately 7% of our sample. Table 4.3 reports
sample statistics for exclusively the near-minimum payers.
4
The customer divison will be further discussed in chapter 6.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics for near-minimum payers
Statistic Median Mean Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Consumption 950 3,255 0 340 3,510 384,400
Repayment 750 3,074 0 0 2,200 500,000
Ratio before 0.2 0.41 0 0 1 1
Monthly transactions 3 6.042 1 2 7 293
Average purchase - 558 - - - -
The near-minimum payers’ average repayment ratio before the intervention is 41%, while
the median is 20%, indicating that most repayments are lower than the average. Hence,
the repayment ratio distribution is skewed to the left. Furthermore, we observe that




In this chapter, we present the estimation methods conducted to quantify the causal
impact of changing the default option on repayment. We present pooled OLS, fixed effects
estimation and assumptions underlying the preferred model.
5.1 Pooled OLS
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (pooled OLS) estimation is the starting point in providing
the coefficient estimate of interest. The estimator is applied to panel data structures, and
ignores the panel structure of the data by treating all observations equally (Wooldridge,
2016). We illustrate a basic panel data regression model without control variables in the
following equation:
Yit = ↵ +  1Xit + uit (5.1)
In equation 5.1, Yit denotes the dependent variable for a given individual i at time t. Xit
is the independent variable of interest. The regression line intercept is denoted by ↵,
while uit is the composite error term, defined as uit = ↵i + ✏it. The composite error term
consists of both time-invariant unobservables denoted by ↵i, and idiosyncratic errors ✏it,
which varies across individuals and time.
The pooled OLS estimator assumes exogeneity, meaning that the composite error term
must be uncorrelated with the independent variable of interest. A violation to this
assumption would yield endogeneity bias, meaning that the value of the estimated
coefficients are not reflective of their true population value (Wooldridge, 2016). A
common source to endogeneity is omitted variables, which will end up being absorbed by
the error term when not controlled for. This would in turn provide our estimate with bias.
A way of solving this problem is to include any factors that we suspect to provide our
estimate with omitted variable bias. However, including such variables might be difficult
in a panel data set, due to variation in two dimensions. In our case, an example could be
unobserved individual fixed effects that correlate with the implementation of the invoice
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regulation. As we wish to reduce the possibility for omitted variable bias, we emphasize
the fixed- and random effects estimators.
5.2 Choosing a fixed effects or random effects estimator
A central advantage with the fixed- and random effects estimators, is that they eliminate
time-constant unobservables that might be correlated with the independent and dependent
variable of interest (Wooldridge, 2016). While the fixed effects (FE) estimator allows for
correlation between ↵i and Xit, the random effects (RE) estimator requires ↵i to be both
random and uncorrelated with Xit in order to yield consistent and unbiased estimates.
As we wish to allow arbitrary correlation between fixed individual-specific effects and the
invoice regulation, the fixed effects estimator seems to be a more convincing tool.
The standard test to determine which of the aforementioned models to use, is
the specification test developed by Hausman (1978). The test checks whether estimators
yield significantly different coefficient estimates (Wooldridge, 2016). If   estimates are
close, the RE method is preferred. Applying the Hausman test to our data5, the reported
results show that there is correlation between ↵i and Xit, implying that the random effect
assumption is violated. Hence, we choose the fixed effects estimator.
5.3 Fixed effects estimator
The fixed effects estimator which is also known as the within estimator, uses transformation
to remove the time-invariant effect ↵i prior to estimation. Specifically, the estimator
demeans away any observation in the regression that is constant across time (Wooldridge,
2016). Equations 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 demonstrate the demeaning process:
Yit = ↵i +  1Xit + ✏it (5.2)
In equation 5.2, Yit denotes the dependent variable, ↵i denote the unobserved time-
invariant effect while Xit is the dependent variable of interest. The time-variant errors
are captured by ✏it. For each individual i, we average equation 5.2 over time t, and get:
5
The Hausman test results are provided in appendix table B.1.
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Yi = ↵i +  1Xi + ✏i (5.3)
Subtracting the average from each individual i over time t (5.3  5.2), we obtain:
Yit   Yi =  1(Xit  Xi) + (✏it   ✏i) (5.4)
The crucial feature about the demeaned data shown in 5.4 is that the unobserved fixed
effect ↵i is eliminated from the equation, which makes pooled OLS estimation consistent,
conditional on the idiosyncratic error term ✏it being uncorrelated with the independent
variable. Because the within estimator itself controls for individual heterogeneity, it does
not allow inclusion of any time-invariant explanatory variables, as they will disappear
in the transformation. Despite the allowance of correlation between ↵i and Xit, the FE
estimator can still be subject to omitted variable bias if the explanatory variable of interest
is correlated with the idiosyncratic errors (Wooldridge, 2016).
5.3.1 Assumptions behind the fixed effects estimator
The assumptions underlying the pooled OLS estimator apply to the fixed effects estimator
too (Wooldridge, 2016). Given that the assumptions hold, the fixed effects estimator will
be the best linear unbiased estimator. We present the assumptions, and elaborate on
whether they are fulfilled in our particular case.
Random sample
The random sample assumption relies on inference being drawn from the sample point
estimates to the population estimates (Wooldridge, 2016). Our 25% sample is considered a
random sample of the entire Eika credit card customer population, hence, the assumption
is satisfied.
No perfect collinearity
Perfect collinearity implies that two or more regressors are perfectly correlated, that is,
one regressor can be written as a linear combination of the other(s) (Wooldridge, 2016).
In such a case, the model will not manage to distinguish the actual effect on each of the
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variables, introducing a collinearity problem. Perfect collinearity affects the precision
of the estimates and standard errors of the concerned variables. However, it does not
bias the estimate of the independent variable we aim to estimate the causal effect of -  ̂.
Hence, we do not address the issue any further.
Zero conditional mean
The assumption of zero conditional mean implies that the expected value of the
idiosyncratic errors given the explanatory variables in all time periods and the unobserved
effect, is zero (Wooldridge, 2016). Any violation of this assumption, leads to endogeneity




Omitted variable bias arises if there exist omitted variables that are correlated
with Xit and a determinant of Yit (Wooldridge, 2016). In our study, it seems unlikely that
any event affecting repayment ratio occurred simultaneously with the change of default
option. Thus, omitted variables seem to be a negligible concern.6
Simultaneity implies that the dependent variable is also a determinant of the
independent variable. Applied to our case, this is not an relevant issue to consider.
Measurement error of the dependent variable is clearly a discussion point in our
study. The problem arises because repayment ratio is based upon the assumption that
debt is repaid the month after credit card usage. We cannot prove that this is the case
for all customers, as some possibly postpone the repayment. Therefore, we are faced
with an approximate rather than a perfect measure of repayment. Because there is no
reason to suspect that the measurement error is systematic or correlated with any of
the independent variables, the concerned issue does not incur any violation of the zero
conditional mean assumption (Wooldridge, 2016).
6
We include control variables to address potential problems with omitted variables, which will be
discussed at a later point.
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We consider a random sample of Eika’s customers, observing no perfect collinearity nor
endogeneity issues. Consequently, the fixed effects estimator should yield unbiased results
(Wooldridge, 2016).
No heteroskedasticity or serial correlation
The assumption of no heteroskedasticity implies that the variance of the error term for
each individual in each time period must be constant. Non-constant variance do not
cause estimator bias or inconsistency, but affects the size of the standard errors. Hence,
heteroskedasticity implies that t-statistics and confidence intervals are no longer valid
(Wooldridge, 2016).
No serial correlation implies that idiosyncratic errors must be uncorrelated with
each other, in all time periods. Because our panel data consists of repeated observations
for individuals over time, our data might raise the issue of serial correlation. Specifically,
a customer’s repayment ratio in one period will be an indicator of the repayment ratio for
the same customer in the next period. If this is the case, statistical inference becomes
unreliable if not corrected for (Wooldridge, 2016).
We test for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation through a Breusch-Pagan
and Breusch-Godfrey test7 which reveal that standard errors are both serial correlated
and non-constant. A common approach to solve the inference issue that arises with
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, is to apply clustered standard errors (Wooldridge,
2016). Hence, we apply clustered standard errors on both the individual- and time
dimension of our panel data. Given that the presented assumptions hold, the fixed effects
estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator. .
7
Results of the Breusch-Pagan and Breusch-Godfrey tests are reported in appendix table B.2 and B.3
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5.4 Main model specification
We employ a within estimator on our panel data. Our main model includes dummies to
control for month-fixed effects as well as the control variables Monthly transactions and
Log(Consumption). The rationale behind the choice of control variables is the expectation
that both consumption and the number of transactions are explaining some of the variation
in credit card repayment ratio. Another incentive is to reduce potential sources of omitted
variable bias. Such a bias could occur if the default option change and repayment behavior
is correlated with spending patterns. The motivation behind using the logarithm of
consumption is that it leads to coefficients with more appealing interpretations while it
also narrows the range, which is particularly true for large monetary values (Wooldridge,
2016). Equation 5.5 presents the regression model we estimate to capture the effect of the
the default option change on repayment ratio:
Yit =  1Xt +  2C1it +  3C2it + ↵i +  m + ✏it (5.5)
where the dependent variable Yit is the repayment ratio for a given individual i at time
t. Xt is the independent variable we are interested in estimating the effect of, which is
a dummy that equals 1 after the regulation and 0 before, denoted as Post regulation in
the regressions in chapter 6. C1it and C2it represent the time-varying control variables
Log(Consumption) and Monthly transactions. ↵i captures unobserved time-invariant
effects at the individual level.  m represents dummies for month fixed effects, capturing
the effect of a specific month m affecting all individuals. Lastly, ✏it is the time-varying
error. Our objective is to estimate  1, which represents the change in average repayment
ratio following the invoice regulation.
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6 Analysis
In this chapter, we aim to estimate the effect of changing the default option on repayment
behavior. We divide the chapter into two main sections with the purpose of testing the
presented hypotheses. Firstly, we estimate the average effect for all credit card customers
in the sample. Secondly, we divide the sample into groups with the purpose of testing
whether the impact differs among various customers. We utilize our specified main
regression model in both instances.
We visualize the evolution in repayment means over the total period in figure
6.1. We observe no clear change in the average size of repayment ratio. However, the plot
shows a tendency of slightly higher values after the regulation8. Month-specific patterns
seem to be evident, which we will look further into at a later point.
Figure 6.1: Development in average repayment ratio
8
The vertical blue line marks the time of regulation.
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To test our first hypothesis, we start by using a pooled OLS estimator, followed by various
fixed effects approaches. Subsequently, we include control variables in the model and
report the baseline estimate of interest in column (6).
Regression (1) shows the pooled OLS estimation without control variables, regression
(2) is a fixed effects estimation accounting for exclusively individual-specific effects,
regression (3) is a pooled OLS estimation including exclusively month fixed effects while
regression (4) shows a fixed effects model including both individual- and month fixed
effects. Regression (5) and (6) subsequently add the control variables Log(Consumption)
and Monthly transactions to regression (4).
Table 6.1: Pooled OLS and fixed effect models with control variables
Dependent variable:
Repayment ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Ind. fixed effects Time fixed effects Both FE Both FE with one control Both FE with two controls
Post regulation 0.008 0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.009⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤⇤ 0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
January 0.001 0.002  0.001  0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
February  0.003  0.004  0.007  0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.001)
March  0.009  0.010  0.010  0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
April  0.014  0.016  0.014  0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
May 0.027⇤⇤⇤ 0.024⇤⇤⇤ 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.031⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
June  0.010  0.012⇤  0.006  0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
July  0.010  0.013  0.005  0.004
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
August  0.011  0.013⇤  0.008  0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
September  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
October  0.014⇤  0.015⇤  0.011  0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
November  0.006  0.007  0.003  0.003







Observations 1,832,529 1,832,529 1,832,529 1,832,529 1,832,529 1,832,529
R2 0.0001 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.028 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.0001  0.025 0.001  0.024 0.003 0.004
Residual Std. Error 0.360 (df = 1832516)
F Statistic 195.836⇤⇤⇤ (df = 1; 1832527) 665.455⇤⇤⇤ (df = 1; 1786910) 154.898⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 1832516) 210.431⇤⇤⇤ (df = 12; 1786899) 3,990.602⇤⇤⇤ (df = 13; 1786898) 3,845.697⇤⇤⇤ (df = 14; 1786897)
Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parantheses r⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Interpreting the coefficient estimate of Post regulation in regression (1), repayment ratio
is approximately 0.8 percentage points higher after the regulation than before, ceteris
paribus. The result is not significant. By accounting for individual- and month- fixed
effects separately in column (2) and (3) respectively, we obtain positive and significant
coefficient estimates while the predictive power of the model also slightly increases. This
indicates that both month- and individual fixed effects should be included in the model.
By including both individual- and month fixed effects in model (4), the estimate shows
a slightly larger and statistically significant effect of a 1.5 percentage points average
increase in repayment ratio after the regulation, ceteris paribus.
Basing further analysis on model (4), we add time-variant controls. In column
(5) we include the control Log(Consumption), which obtains a positive coefficient estimate
with high statistical significance at the 1% level. Hence, it appears to be a relevant control
in terms of predicting variation in repayment ratio. Specifically, increasing consumption
with 1% is associated with a 0.00043 average decrease in repayment ratio, everything
else equal. The coefficient estimate of Post regulation barely changes, implying that
Log(Consumption) is not strongly correlated with Post regulation. Furthermore, when we
introduce the second control Monthly transactions in column (6), the interpretation is
that one additional transaction is associated with an average decline of 0.002 in repayment
ratio, ceteris paribus. It is evident that both Log(Consumption) and Monthly transactions
are statistically significant and negatively correlated with repayment ratio. The controls
do not appear to be highly correlated, as the coefficient estimate of log(Consumption)
barely changes when including Monthly transactions. The Post regulation estimate also
remains stable. These results suggest that monthly consumption and monthly number of
transactions are both predictive and relevant control variables. The result in column (6)
implies that the default option replacement led to an average increase in repayment ratio
of 1.5 percentage points, everything else equal. In summary, all results except the pooled
OLS estimate in column (1) imply that the regulation had a small positive impact on
average repayment ratio. Further analysis is based upon model (6), as the results indicate
that it is preferred model.9
9
The low R2 implies that credit card repayment is poorly predicted by the variables included in the
model.
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6.2 Testing H2: Varying impact between groups
This section extends the analysis by examining customer heterogeneity, with initial
repayment ratio as the selection criteria for customer division. The customers are divided
into groups based on the following:
Near-minimum payer: Customers who repay less than 50% of their outstanding debt
on average before the intervention
Medium payer: Customers who repay between 50% and 70% of their debt on average
before the change
High payer: Customers who repay between 70% and 90% of their debt on average
before the intervention
Very high payer: Customers who repay more than 90% of their debt on average before
the intervention
Table 6.2: Customers divided into groups based on initial repayment
Customer type Amount of customers Fraction
Near-minimum payer 3,202 7.0 %
Medium payer 11,757 25.8 %
High payer 18,640 40.9 %
Very high payer 12,019 26.3 %
Table 6.2 displays that the distribution of customer types is skewed, and that the vast
majority of customers on average are repaying more than 50% of outstanding debt
intially. Following our second hypothesis, we expect that customers who had a low
average repayment ratio before the intervention, would increase their repayment ratio
relatively more than the other customers as a response to the regulation. The rationale
is that customers who initially followed the default, paid the minimum amount stated
on the invoice. Given that these customers continued to pay the default following the
change, we would expect to see the largest increase in average repayment ratio among
the near-minimum payers. The higher paying customers on the other hand, were already
paying full or close to the full credit card balance and were thus not able to increase
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their repayment in a similar manner. In order to further investigate this hypothesis, we
examine the average monthly repayment patterns for the various customer groups over
the time period10.
Figure 6.2: Development in average repayment ratio for various customer groups
Figure 6.2 reveals an immediate distinct increase in average repayment ratio for the
near-minimum payers, coinciding with the time of the default option change. The increase
is smaller, but also evident for the medium payers. The figure shows no visible increase for
the high payers, whilst the very high paying group exhibit a slight decline in repayment
ratio. The latter could intuitively appear strange, and will be addressed in the discussion
chapter. The illustrated development suggests that the altered default option exhibited
varying impact among the payer types. In figure 6.3 we illustrate the magnitude of the
overall change in average repayment ratio before and after the regulation, for all payer
types.
10
The vertical blue line marks the time of the regulation
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Figure 6.3: Change in average repayment ratio for various customer groups
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 display a development consistent with what we would expect to
observe if our second hypothesis is correct. Specifically, the near-minimum payers
demonstrate a considerably larger increase in repayment ratio than the other groups.
The near-minimum and medium payers show a 50.7% and 12.2% average increase in
repayment ratio, respectively. The high payers exhibit a quite stable repayment trend,
while the very high payers show a decrease of 7.4%. The fact that the change in average
repayment coincided with the time of the altered default option, strongly indicates that
the altered behavior is caused by the invoice regulation.
In order to further identify whether the observed increased average repayment is
a cause of customers responding to the new default option11, we investigate the
composition of repayments within the various customer groups.
11
Responding to the new default option implies repaying the full outstanding amount stated on the
invoice
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Figure 6.4: Composition of repayments for various customer groups
Figure 6.4 displays the distribution of the various groups’ repayments, both before and
after the intervention12. Figure 6.4 reveals that the average increase in repayment among
near-minimum and medium payers (shown in figure 6.2 and 6.3) is a result of a rise in
the number of full repayments combined with a fall in the number of near minimum
repayments. The high payers do not appear to change repayment behavior, while there is
a drop in the number of full repayments among the very high payers. The change in
the groups’ composition of repayments is consistent with the development in repayment
patterns observed in figure 6.2 and 6.3.
Overall, the figures provide valuable insight. Firstly, we observe an immediate
and sharp increase in repayment among the groups that initially paid the least, which
is also a persistent pattern. Secondly, we see that repayments in both periods have a
bimodal distribution with repayments located close to the minimum and full amount.
What is interesting is that at the time of the default option change, we observe a rise in
the number of full repayments concurrently with a fall in the number of near-minimum
12
In the figure, Near minimum repayments are repayments of less that 50% of total debt, Medium
repayments are repayments between 50 and 70% of total debt, High repayments are between 70 and 90%
of debt, while Full repayments are repayments of the entire debt
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repayments. This strongly suggests that several customers paid the default option amount,
and consequently increased repayments, as a result of the invoice adjustment. Lastly, we
see that the impact of the regulation differs for various customer groups, with the low
payers being more affected than other customers. In summary, the findings substantiate
our second hypothesis and suggest that the observed improved repayment behavior is
attributed to the default effect. In order to analyze the causal impact of the intervention
on the customer groups, we employ our main specified regression model on each group.
Results are reported in table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Regression table for customer groups
Dependent variable:
Repayment ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Near-minimum payers Medium payers High payers Very high payers
Post regulation 0.192⇤⇤⇤ 0.075⇤⇤⇤  0.004  0.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
January  0.043⇤⇤⇤  0.008 0.006 0.004
(0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007)
February  0.023  0.017⇤  0.007 0.002
(0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
March  0.043⇤⇤⇤  0.023⇤⇤ 0.002  0.013
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017)
April  0.030⇤⇤  0.015⇤⇤⇤  0.007⇤⇤  0.024⇤
(0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013)
May 0.023⇤ 0.044⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.011
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
June  0.021  0.012 0.003  0.019⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
July  0.001  0.008 0.001  0.020
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.022)
August  0.021  0.019  0.002  0.002
(0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
September  0.013  0.003 0.008  0.013
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
October  0.035⇤⇤⇤  0.018⇤  0.006  0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
November  0.033⇤⇤  0.010 0.008⇤  0.008
(0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
Log(Consumption)  0.043⇤⇤⇤  0.048⇤⇤⇤  0.048⇤⇤⇤  0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Monthly transactions  0.004⇤⇤⇤  0.003⇤⇤⇤  0.001⇤⇤⇤  0.0004⇤
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Observations 112,214 492,064 818,954 409,306
R2 0.068 0.041 0.039 0.021
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.016 0.017  0.007
F Statistic 566.515⇤⇤⇤ 1,473.434⇤⇤⇤ 2,311.404⇤⇤⇤ 620.105⇤⇤⇤
(df = 14; 108998) (df = 14; 479688) (df = 14; 800377) (df = 14; 397832)
Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parantheses r⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Examining the coefficient estimate for near-minimum payers in regression (1), the
regulation implied an average increase in repayment ratio of 19.2 percentage points, ceteris
paribus. Further, column (2) shows that the medium payers increase their repayment
ratio by 7.5 percentage points following the regulation. Both estimates are statistically
significant at the 1% level. Column (3) yields a slightly negative coefficient estimate,
however not significant, implying no changed repayment behavior among high payers.
Lastly, the result from column (4) implies that the intervention had a negative impact on
the very high payers. The findings comply with the aforementioned figures. Generally,
the results show that the impact of the intervention is largest for customers that are most
likely to make low repayments.
6.3 Robustness tests
In order to test the robustness of our results, we conducted a sensitivity test to investigate
whether altering the time frame impacts our results. Subsequently, we conducted a placebo
test on a part of the dataset where no real intervention is evident (before the intervention),
to verify that the observed estimated effects are not attributed to other effects than the
invoice regulation. We employ our main regression model in both tests, and compare the
obtained estimates with the findings from table 6.1 and 6.3.
Sensitivity test
The sensitivity test is conducted both for all customers in the sample and the near-
minimum payers exclusively. Tables C.1 and C.2 in the appendix show the effects of the
regulation when we limit the post-change period to be 3, 6, 9 and 12 months, respectively.
The yielded coefficient estimates are fairly similar to our baseline estimates (provided in
column (6) in table 6.1 and column (1) in table 6.3). The results show that the effect
is prevalent regardless of the time range, with a slightly larger magnitude in the short term.
Placebo test
We conducted a placebo test by regressing our main model on the full period before the
real intervention. We created an artificial independent variable Post regulation, which
is a dummy that is 1 after February 2016 and 0 before.13. The placebo test discloses a
13
The period before the artificial invoice regulation ranges from May 2015 to February 2016, while the
after period is from February 2016 to February 2017
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slight decrease in repayment ratio of 1.4 percentage points for both the sample and the
near-minimum payers, following the artificial change. The results (appendix table C.3)
are however not statistically significant. Overall, the placebo test provides evidence that




The previous chapter provided our findings on the effect of the default option change on
repayment ratio. In the following chapter, we discuss the interpretation of the findings,
which implications they have and to what extent they can be trusted.
The results provide unequivocal and strong support in favor of our hypotheses,
suggesting that the default option replacement had a positive impact on Norwegian credit
card customers’ repayment behavior. However, the average effect is small, which is a
consequence of the majority of customers already repaying their entire credit card balance.
What is interesting, is that the overall increase appears to be driven by customers who
initially paid the least, as they tend to be most responsive to the default option change,
as shown in figure 6.2. The estimated effects passes all robustness checks, which provides
further evidence in favor of our hypotheses.
Contrary to the findings of Jones et al. (2015), we find that the effect is largest
for customers who initially repaid a low proportion of their credit card debt. The results
provide evidence that the intervention led to a distinct and immediate improvement in
repayment behavior for the near-minimum and medium payers. Most striking is the
finding that the near-minimum payers increase their repayment ratio by 19.2 percentage
points, following the regulation. By investigating the composition of repayments for the
near-minimum and medium payers, it is evident that the majority of repayments are
located around the minimum and the full repayment in both periods (shown in figure
6.4). What is interesting, is that we observe a change in the composition of repayments in
association with the intervention. Specifically, there is a considerable rise in the number
of full repayments simultaneously with a decline in near-minimum repayments. The
relative change is largest for the near-minimum payers, but also prevalent for medium
payers. Taken together, the findings suggest that a substantial proportion of customers
who tended to pay an amount close to the minimum before the intervention, more often
pay the full amount as a result of the default option change.
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As shown in figure 6.3 and 6.4, the high payers do not change their average repayment
behavior nor the composition of their repayments. The very high payers on the other
hand, appear to decrease their repayment post-intervention, which could seem counter
intuitive. Such a finding could imply that what we observe is in reality a regression
towards the mean, meaning that extreme outcomes tend to be followed by moderate ones.
This would imply that there is no actual increase or decrease and that the observed
differences are rather due to pure chance (Bland and Altman, 1994). Another plausible
explanation is that customers initially repaying in full, start paying the default amount
following the regulation. Prior to the regulation, these customers had to actively alter the
amount in order to pay the full credit card balance. As the regulation implied the invoice
displaying the full credit card balance as the balance, they no longer had to adjust the
repayment. However, the default amount does not include debt incurred from the end of
the previous month until the due date of the invoice. In that respect, it is reasonable to
assume that some customers who would previously include recent consumption in their
repayments, merely accept the default option post-intervention. Accordingly, we would
expect the intervention to imply a slightly lower average repayment ratio for this group.
Following this argument, we would expect the very high payers to respond in a manner
similar to what we observe in figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, as a result of paying the novel
default option stated on the invoice. Thus, a default effect would be attributed to this
group too.
It is worth noting that we can not be certain whether the changed repayment
behavior is caused by a default effect, an anchoring effect or other potential factors14.
However, the varying impact among the groups suggests that at least parts of the observed
effect is attributed to the default effect. The rationale is that, in the event of an anchoring
effect we would expect the customer groups to exhibit a relatively similar magnitude of
average adjustment. In contrast, our results imply that the regulation affected the groups
with varying magnitude, which advocates a default effect. This argument is further
supported by the bimodal distribution of repayments for near-minimum and medium
payers, displaying that most repayments are located around the near-minimum and full
amount. However, we cannot fully disregard the possibility of one or the other effect, or
14
Note: The distinction between the default effect and anchoring effect is provided within the literature
review in chapter 2.
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that it might be a composited effect.
Our findings suggest that the intervention produced overall positive effects in its mission
to improve repayment behavior, consistent with previous research on the default effect
(Choi et al., 2001; Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). Equivalent to the finding that automatic
enrollment in organ donation and pension saving programs led to increased participation,
the changed invoice default option seems to automatically "enroll" choice averse customers
into paying the novel default option. Moreover, because consistently repaying the
minimum amount would entail the largest costs in terms of interest and fees, the finding
that the near minimum payers are increasing their repayment the most, implies that the
intervention also succeeded in targeting the customers most crucial to affect.
7.1 Limitations
Throughout this section, we will shed light on what limitations we believe are the most
prominent in our research.
7.1.1 Data limitations
The data preparation introduces potential caveats. Firstly, we have characterized all
negative transactions as consumption and all positive transactions as repayments. Such
a division will be appropriate in most cases, although there might be some transaction
misplacements as discussed in the subsection on data preparation. Secondly, the repayment
ratio is limited to be a number between 0 and 1, in order to prevent particularly high
repayments to push the distribution in any direction. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
this limitation might yield an artificially low ratio for some customers in certain periods.
7.1.2 Internal validity
The internal validity of the study regards whether the established causal relationship is
net of all other confounding factors (Gertler et al., 2016), and thus, can be trusted. A




The policy change of interest introduces a potential challenge regarding empirical
estimation. Ideally, we would want to divide credit card customers into treatment- and
control groups to observe whether the control group demonstrated a counterfactual
outcome. However, as the intervention affected all credit card holders in Norway, we
cannot divide the sample into control- and treatment groups. Hence, the non-experimental
design makes it impossible to identify how repayment patterns would have evolved in
absence of the policy change. Accordingly, the internal validity of our estimated effects is
weaker than it would have been through an experimental design.
Potential confounding factors
One could argue that the rise in repayment ratio observed after the intervention, rather
is a result of general economic conditions than the actual default option change. For
illustration, if taxes are reduced simultaneously with the regulation and lead people to
improve repayment behavior, not controlling for this tax relief will provide our estimate
with omitted variable bias. However, if the significant increase in repayment ratio was in
fact a cause of other factors, we would expect the various payer types to exhibit a more
similar development in repayment patterns. Although confounding factors seems to be an
unlikely issue, it still poses a minor risk.
7.1.3 External validity
Important to any study is the external validity, the extent to which the evaluation sample
is representative of the population of interest (Gertler et al., 2016). Because we utilize a
random sample of Eika’s credit card customers, it is considered representative for the credit
bank’s entire population. Accordingly, the obtained regression results can be generalized
to the bank’s entire customer base. Eika’s credit card customers could however differ from
other credit card customers, limiting the external validity of the study. We make the
argument that because Eika’s credit card population constitutes a substantial proportion
of all Norwegian credit card customers15, the results are reasonably valid for the entire
Norwegian population.
15
According to Norsk Gjeldsinformasjon (2020), there is approximately 3 million customers with credit
cards in Norway. As Eika has approximately 330,000 credit card customers, their proportion of the market
is approximately 11%
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7.2 Further research
Another interesting consideration is the economic impact of customers repaying a larger
proportion of their credit card debt. A conceivable possibility is that repaying a larger
part of the credit card balance have an adverse effect on other financial obligations.
Hence, collecting comprehensive data on the customers’ financial obligations, would make
it possible to identify the total financial implications of the regulation.
Additionally, equivalent research could be conducted across different countries to
identify potential contrasting responses to such an intervention. As shown in table 4.2 and
in surveys conducted by the FSA (Regjeringen, 2016), Norwegian credit card customers
exhibit a high degree of debt repayment in general. Consequently, a potential topic for




Within the field of behavioral economics, the default effect is a prominent concept
describing how individuals exhibit behavior that differs from standard economic theory
(DellaVigna, 2009). It has been the basis for several behavioral nudges aiming to affect
individuals’ behavior, often yielding promising results.
The purpose of our study was to quantify the causal impact of a regulation imposed on
all Norwegian credit card issuing institutions in 2017. The regulation involved changing
the default repayment option from the minimum amount to the full outstanding credit
card balance. In that respect, we wished to find out whether the intervention had any
impact on repayment behavior, for whom and to what extent.
In order to test the hypotheses, we utilized all available account-level data gathered
from Eika Kredittbank, and extracted a random 25% sample ranging from May 2015 to
December 2019. For that purpose, we calculated a proxy for repayment ratio defined
as lagged repayment divided by consumption for each customer in each month. We
employed a fixed effects estimator controlling for individual heterogeneity, month-fixed
effects, monthly consumption and the number of transactions.
We find evidence that replacing the minimum amount with the entire credit card balance
as the default option, led to improved repayment behavior among Norwegian credit card
customers. Specifically, we observe a small increase in average repayment ratio of 1.5
percentage points. By dividing the customers into various groups with pre-intervention
repayment ratio as the selection criteria, we observed substantial effects. Near-minimum
and medium paying customers show an increase in average repayment ratio of 19.2 and
7.5 percentage points, respectively. There is no evident change in repayment pattern for
the high paying group, while the very-high payers exhibit a decrease in average repayment
ratio. We argue that the latter could be a result of very-high paying customers passively
accepting the new default amount, and accordingly no longer include newly incurred
debt in their repayments. Furthermore, we witness that the sharp and distinct change in
repayment ratio occurs immediately after the imposed regulation for all affected customer
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groups. Interestingly, the composition of repayments strongly indicates that customers
who initially repaid the least tend to repay the full amount more often after the change.
In summary, the results strengthen the argument that the changed repayment behavior is
in fact a causal implication of the regulation, attributed to the default effect.
Our study joins the ranks of several studies aiming to improve repayment behavior
through implementation of regulations. To our knowledge, we are the first to find such
a strong link between an altered default option and improved repayment behavior. In
contrast to the findings of Jones et al. (2015), we find that the governmental intervention
succeeded in targeting the customers most crucial to affect, which suggests that a nudge
through the default option can be more effective than other complex regulations.
In summary, our overall findings show that default options matter in human
decision making. Most importantly, the results show that the simple act of changing a
default option can be an effective measure in combating increasing interest costs that
follows incautious credit card use. The findings demonstrate that current and future
policy makers should recognize that default options can serve as powerful and cost-efficient
tools in altering human decision making.
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Figure A.1: Informational letter issued to Eika credit card customers regarding the
implementation of the invoice regulation
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Table A.1: Bank distribution by county (Eika Alliansen, 2020)
Agder Innlandet Møre og Romsdal Nordland
Arendal og Omegns Sparekasse Etnedal Sparebank Romsdalsbanken Gildeskål Sparebank
Birkenes Sparebank Grue Sparebank Sunndal Sparebank Grong Sparebank
Evje og Hornnes Sparebank Jbf bank og forsikring Surnadal Sparebank Jbf bank og forsikring
Jbf bank og forsikring Odal Sparebank Ørskog Sparebank Sparebank 68 Grader Nord
Kvinesdal Sparebank Tolga-Os Sparebank Sparebanken Narvik
Valle Sparebank Totens Sparebank Ofoten Sparebank
Østre Agder Sparebank Valdres Sparebank
Oslo Rogaland Vestfold og Telemark Vestland
Bank2 Hjelmeland Sparebank Andebu Sparebank Jbf bank og forsikring
Bien Sparebank Jbf bank og forsikring Drangedal Sparebank Sogn Sparebank
Jbf bank og forsikring Jæren Sparebank Hjartdal og Gransherad Sparebank Tysnes Sparebank
RørosBanken Sandnes Sparebank Larvikbanken Vekselbanken
Troms og Finnmark NORDirektebank-del av Skagerrak Spb.




Aasen Sparebank Askim og Spydeberg Sparebank Forsikring Helgeland
Bjugn Sparebank Aurskog Sparebank Jbf bank og forsikring
Grong Sparebank Berg Sparebank Penger.no
Haltdalen Sparebank Blaker Sparebank Sparebanken Møre
Hegra Sparebank Eidsberg Sparebank
Hemne Sparebank Fornebu Sparebank
MelhusBanken Høland og Setskog
Nidaros Sparebank Hønefoss Sparebank
Oppdalsbanken Jbf bank og forsikring
Orkla Sparebank LillestrømBanken
RørosBanken Marker Sparebank
Rindal Sparebank Skue Sparebank
Selbu Sparebank Strømmen Sparebank





B.1 The Hausman test
Table B.1 presents the results from the Hausman test, which is used to test whether to use
a fixed- or random effects estimator. The results show that the random effects estimator
is inconsistent and biased, hence we employ the fixed effects estimator in further analysis.
Table B.1: Hausman test
Chisquared DF P-value Conclusion
581 12 2.2e-13 Inconsistent
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B.2 Breusch-Pagan test
Table B.2 exhibits the results from a studentized Breusch-Pagan test for the prevalence of
heteroskedasticity. The results provide evidence of heteroskedasticity. We make the results
robust for heteroskedasticity by applying clustered standard errors in all regressions.
Table B.2: Breusch-Pagan test
BP DF P-value Conclusion
1677 12 2.2e-13 Heteroskedasticity
B.3 Breusch-Godfrey test
Table B.3 displays the results from running the Breusch-Godfrey/Woolridge test for serial
correlation in panel models. Based on this test, serially correlated standard errors are
present. Hence, we apply clustering to the standard errors to control for serial correlation.
Table B.3: Breusch-Godfrey test
Chisquared DF P-value Conclusion
26425 2 2.2e-13 Serial correlated errors
C Robustness tests
C.1 Sensitivity tests




(3 months) (6 months) (9 months) (12 months) (Full period)
Post intervention 0.023⇤⇤⇤ 0.024⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 815,878 922,083 1,026,335 1,128,125 1,832,529
R2 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029
Adjusted R2  0.023  0.018  0.013  0.010 0.004
F Statistic 1,950.552⇤⇤⇤ 2,111.132⇤⇤⇤ 2,284.569⇤⇤⇤ 2,453.952⇤⇤⇤ 3,845.697⇤⇤⇤
(df = 14; 770246) (df = 14; 876451) (df = 14; 980703) (df = 14; 1082493) (df = 14; 1786897)
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Note: Month-fixed effects, the log of monthly consumption and monthly transactions are included as control variables.
Clustered standard errors are reported in the parantheses
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(3month) (6month) (9month) (12month) (Full period)
Post intervention 0.194⇤⇤⇤ 0.185⇤⇤⇤ 0.181⇤⇤⇤ 0.178⇤⇤⇤ 0.192⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 44,047 51,310 58,377 65,332 112,214
R2 0.057 0.062 0.062 0.064 0.068
Adjusted R2  0.017  0.001 0.008 0.015 0.040
F Statistic 177.052⇤⇤⇤ 226.818⇤⇤⇤ 262.066⇤⇤⇤ 301.287⇤⇤⇤ 566.515⇤⇤⇤
(df = 14; 40831) (df = 14; 48094) (df = 14; 55161) (df = 14; 62116) (df = 14; 108998)
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Note: Month-fixed effects, the log of monthly consumption and monthly transactions are included as control variables.
Clustered standard errors are reported in the parantheses
C.2 Placebo test
Table C.3: Placebo test: main model regressions before the intervention
Dependent variable:
Ratio
(All customers) (Near-minimum payers)




Adjusted R2  0.037  0.082
F Statistic 1,545.453⇤⇤⇤ (df = 14; 630785) 43.589⇤⇤⇤ (df = 14; 31206)
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Note: Month-fixed effects, the log of monthly consumption and monthly transactions are included as control variables.
Post intervention is an artificial dummy that is 0 from May 2015 until February 2016 an 1 between February 2016 and February 2017.
Clustered standard errors are reported in the parantheses
